https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/168-The-Soleimani-Killing-Initial-Assessments.pdf
Key excerpt:
Some might argue that the drone strike at Baghdad Airport was another example of a high-tech operation by the US against its foes that was a tactical success but a strategic failure. Holders of this view might infer, in light of the Iranian regime’s newly strengthened ability to stir outrage against the US, that it is coming out of this series of clashes as the winner despite the loss of Soleimani.
This is an erroneous reading.
Soleimani’s death is a major blow to Iran.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s designation of Esmail Ghaani, Soleimani’s second- in-command, as Soleimani’s successor as head of the Quds Force is an indicator of the magnitude of that blow. Ghaani is in his sixties (as was Soleimani)—not the ideal age to take over a major undercover organization with tentacles throughout much of the Middle East and beyond.
Over 20 years ago, sometime between the fall of 1997 and the first months of 1998, a younger, more vibrant Islamic revolutionary leadership chose 40-year-old Soleimani over his superiors to head this elite unit. Khamenei is older and less willing to take the risk of choosing a daring young commander, but that is not the only reason why he did not do so.
Even if the ayatollah were inclined to select a younger replacement, the targeting of Soleimani prevents him from making such a choice. The killing proves beyond doubt that the Iranian security system is riddled with informants. They knew when Soleimani left his secret hideout in Damascus, what plane he boarded, at which airport he was going to land, which vehicles he and his retinue entered upon landing, and exactly what time those vehicles were heading out of the airport.
This suggests an information flow involving tens if not hundreds of informants closely connected to the upper echelons of the Quds Force. These informants could and did provide this information to their American counterparts in real time to get the US helicopters in position for the kill.
The killing of Number Two in any country creates a devastating chain of destructive suspicion and anxiety in the corridors of power.
Khamenei’s only choice in naming a successor was to choose from among old stalwarts who are above suspicion. Every individual who is newer to the organization and to the wider security network is now suspect.
Many will no doubt be removed if not executed as Iranian counter- intelligence teams try to identify the informants. The problem for the regime is figuring out who is going to replace them.
https://rantburg.com/poparticle.php?D=01/08/2020&SO=&HC=1&ID=560488
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